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THE HUNTSVILLE HISTORICAL REVIEW

Volume 4 April, 1974 Number 2

Editor
Elbert L. Watson

PUBLISHED BY
THE HUNTSVILLE HISTORICAL SOCIETY

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Huntsville, Alabama
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DISAFFECTION IN MADISON COUNTY BEFORE AND DURING THE CIVIL WAR

By Sarah Etheline Bounds

The election of Abraham Lincoln was the decisive factor in turning a majority of the people of Alabama in favor of secession. Public opinion in North Alabama, however, was strongly opposed to such action. According to Clement Claiborne Clay, then a current United States Senator from Alabama, "Huntsville is the center of disaffection." Also, Walter L. Fleming, the foremost authority on Alabama during the Civil War and Reconstruction period, identifies four of the five prominent Alabama unionists as having lived in Huntsville.

Since there were a number of disaffected elements, a rather detailed definition of these groups is necessary for an understanding of the subject. Secessionists wanted immediate and separate secession of Alabama, regardless of the action in the other southern states. The opponents of secession were the cooperationists, who were divided into three categories. Some cooperationists wanted the cooperation of the southern states within the Union to force their rights from the central government. Others desired an agreement of the southern states within the Union before seceding to form a Confederacy; while the third class advocated a clear understanding among the southern states before secession. Briefly, the cooperationists were opposed to immediate secession. After secession the cooperationists were unfriendly toward the Confederate admini-
stration, but the majority were loyal to the southern cause. The future Peace Party and Peace Society of Alabama were to arise from the cooperationist opposition to the Confederate government.

Another form of rebellious opposition in Alabama was the unionists or tories. Before secession the term unionist had a very broad meaning, but later it simply included all those who rebelled against or were hostile to the authority of the Confederacy. The unionists joined the army deserters and Peace Societies to obtain their goal of restoration in the Union. ⁴

The strong cooperative feeling in North Alabama has often been credited to a firm attachment and loyalty to the Union. Other more concrete and direct reasons, however, fostered the idea of remaining in the Union. The most likely cause was the relationship of Alabama to Tennessee. Geographically and economically, North Alabama belonged to Tennessee rather than to Alabama. In this position North Alabama would certainly suffer a great hardship if secession were by separate action. Since the prospect of immediate secession in Tennessee was slight, the products of North Alabama might have to be marketed in a foreign country. Treaty arrangements for the regulation of commerce or the return of fugitive slaves could not be made between an independent Alabama and the state of Tennessee. ⁵

In addition, a strong sectional feeling within Alabama had grown for the previous twenty years. Public matters favorable to one section were usually opposed by the other. Since the legislature was under the control of South Alabama, North Alabama was seldom given any aid to develop its resources or to aid its railroad, banking, or educational facilities. The people of North Alabama generally believed little benefit came from being a part of Alabama. On the contrary, Tennessee was greatly improving and advancing the conditions of their state and indirectly those of North Alabama. ⁶

Since the cooperationists were the majority group in
North Alabama, all the counties of the Tennessee Valley were well assured for them. It was felt, however, that the counties' sentiment south of the hill counties would probably change the majority of the state for secession. The cooperationists opened their campaign for the Se­cession Convention scheduled to meet in Montgomery on January 7, 1861 by issuing a circular letter from Hunts­ville dated November 19, 1860. The letter called for a southern convention to consolidate the South into a united front instead of separate state action. The letter, com­posed by Jeremiah Clemens, the leading cooperationist of North Alabama, was signed by one hundred prominent citizens of Huntsville and was widely distributed and printed in sympathetic newspapers throughout the state.

Clemens also carried on a correspondence with United States Senator J. J. Crittenden of Kentucky. He explained to Crittenden that his object for urging a consulta­tion of all the southern states was "to gain time to reach the popular ears." He said, "There is not a sha­dow of a doubt that if the election was held tomorrow two-thirds of the members would be for immediate se­cession. Time is everything to us and if we fail to gain that we are lost." 8

On December 8, 1860, the cooperationists of Mad­ison County chose Jeremiah Clemens and Nicholas Davis as their candidates to the convention. They adopted a series of resolutions repeating the views and plans set forth in the Clemens circular letter. The large number of demands regarding slavery were probably included in these resolutions to mislead the people into postponing secession. The resolution requiring that the action of the convention be referred to a direct vote of the people certainly voiced the sentiments of most North Ala­bamians. 9

The local secessionist convention on December 10, 1860, choose George P. Beirne and M. P. Roberts as candidates. General LeRoy P. Walker, one of the most prominent Alabama secessionists, was asked to oppose
General LeRoy P. Walker
the cooperationists. He refused, however, stating as his reasons the intense local bitterness toward his candidacy and the certainty that Alabama would secede in any case. Actually Walker declined so he would be in a better position to reconcile his opponents after secession. The resolutions adopted at this meeting favored separate state secession, but differed in one respect from the secessionists in Central and South Alabama. One resolution called for the direct approval by the electorate of any agreements made at the convention. Thus, both secessionists and cooperationists of North Alabama desired a popular vote on the decisions of the forthcoming convention.

The statewide election of delegates was held on Monday, December 24, 1860. Voting was slight, probably because the election was more a conflict over principle rather than a conflict among personalities. Of the one hundred delegates elected, fifty-four were secessionists and forty-six were cooperationists. As expected, the central and southern counties sent secessionists, while the northern counties selected cooperationist delegates. In Madison County, the cooperationist vote represented 70 to 80 per cent of the total ballots. The cooperationist candidates, Jeremiah Clemens and Nicholas Davis, received an overwhelming vote with the count of 1487 and 1480 respectively. G. P. Beirne and M. P. Roberts, the secessionist candidates, secured votes of only 404 and 371.

The able speaking team of Clemens and Davis lead the minority cooperatives in the Secession Convention battle. The fight was lost from the beginning, but the cooperationists hoped for delay so that compromises might be given every chance. After the Ordinance of Secession passed, Clemens changed his vote and advised other cooperationists to do the same. He said he realized that this would be regarded as an act of treason, but he was willing to share the perils of the coming revolution in the defense of his native state.
ering his tactics in later years, Clemens probably saw the tide of popular thought and took this move to gain high military or political fortunes for himself.

Although its delegates avowed support, North Alabama was not pleased with the work of the convention, especially since a popular referendum was not allowed. The United States flag continued to fly over the Court House in Athens and Huntsville. At a public meeting in Huntsville, Joseph C. Bradley praised the Union, saying that he would "have his neck stretched three feet and spend his money to the last dollar" before he would consent to the destruction of the Union. 14

With economic ties toward Tennessee and sectional jealousy toward South Alabama, the past chatter of forming a new state became an active idea under the pressure of secession. Many people wanted to withdraw the northern counties of Alabama and unite with the counties of east Tennessee and northeast Georgia to form a new state. Nickajack, an Indian name common in East Tennessee, was to be the name of the new state. Such contemplated action of seceding from secession would mean rebellion and civil war. Lacking the support of politicians and the appearance of leaders, the plan was abandoned after the Lincoln proclamation of April 15, 1861. The outbreak of war crushed the organized resistance in its infancy. 15

The Gilchrist story revealed during the war will illustrate the state of affairs in February and March of 1861. According to the story, J. G. Gilchrist, of Montgomery County, went to the first Confederate Secretary of War, LeRoy P. Walker, urging him to begin the hostilities by firing on Fort Sumter. Gilchrist argued that unless blood was shed the people of Alabama would be back in the Union within ten days. 16

North Alabama seemed to present a solid front for the Confederacy after Lincoln's call for volunteers. During the winter of 1861-1862, John W. DuBose of the Black Belt traveled extensively in the northern counties
as a Confederate recruiting officer, and reported finding all the men loyal to the Confederacy. Discontented persons caused no trouble during the first months of war because only the loyal were needed for the fighting. When the Confederate Congress began to discuss conscription, however, unionists and others began to organize for self-protection and harassment.

The invasion of North Alabama by the Federals early in 1862 increased the discontent and disaffection. The Tennessee Valley was left open to Union penetration after the fall of Fort Donelson on February 16, 1862, and the Confederate retreat to Corinth, Mississippi. On April 11, 1862, General O. M. Mitchell entered Huntsville and his subordinates occupied other North Alabama towns. Protected by the Federals, the disloyal began some activity against the Confederacy. It may have been at this time, or at least soon after, that the Peace Society was organized within the Federal lines and probably at the suggestion of the Federals.

After General Mitchell had remained several months, however, he reported that few Union men could be found in or near Huntsville. The Federals stated that the people favored the Union and opposed the Confederacy, but many feared a "reign of terror" so badly that they were "afraid of their own shadows." Some Union leaders, however, soon appeared and became very active. The four most prominent unionists from Huntsville were Jeremiah Clemens, George W. Lane, David P. Lewis, and David C. Humphreys.

Clemens, although appointed commander of the Alabama militia, became disloyal within less than a year of fighting. As the representative of North Alabama unionists, he went to Washington to obtain a plan for southern restoration, but he was advised by E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, to use his influence for the Union at home. Clemens was such a hated deserter that he was forced to spend much of his time within the safety of the
General O. M. Mitchell
Union lines. His former neighbors and friends gave him the nickname "Arch Traitor."22

Lane never recognized secession and was always an outspoken unionist. He was appointed United States district judge by Lincoln, but was never able to exercise its functions.23 General Mitchell recommended Lane to the position of military governor of Alabama, believing the appointment would satisfy the residents of both Huntsville and North Alabama. In giving the recommendations to Stanton, Mitchell said, "Lane has never swerved from the path of strict duty and loyalty, and whose tattooed and faded flag still waves from the staff to which he nailed it on his house top in sight of my camp."24

Lewis voted against secession, but signed the Ordinance. He was elected to the Provisional Congress and in 1863 was appointed circuit judge by the governor. He held this position for only a few months before deserting to the Federals. Lewis later became a Radical governor of Alabama, serving from 1872 to 1874.25

The other prominent unionist of Huntsville, Judge Humphreys, had represented Morgan and Madison Counties in the Alabama legislature, had opposed secession, but had entered the Confederate service. He was arrested on a charge of disloyalty and later released by order of the Confederate War Department in Richmond. During the remaining months of the war, he organized Union meetings in North Alabama. Judge Humphreys made anti-Confederate and strong Union speeches, submitted elaborate plans for immediate return to the Union, and called upon the governor to hold a convention to consider his plans. After the surrender he allied himself with the Republicans, became a member of the first carpetbag legislature in Alabama, and finally judge of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.26

Of these men of position and influence, Judge Lane is the only one whose loyalty remained constant. He was faithful to the Union from first to last. The others were
erratic persons who changed sides for personal and property reasons. This work, however, encouraged and assured other people of the region. By late 1862, Huntsville was regarded as "the place where Union feeling most prevailed" and the city was credited with setting the tone of political sentiment in North Alabama.

The Confederate war spirit declined and disaffection increased after 1863. The reasons for these changes in feeling are varied and complex. Defeatism, though not known by this term, undermined and drew strength from the South. The enthusiasm of 1861 was dying or at least was chilling to the war effort. Confidence in the Confederacy diminished because of failures in the field, especially Vicksburg and Gettysburg. Many saw the hopelessness of the southern cause and dreaded the useless sacrifices of a continued war. Not only the disloyal, but the loyal as well, began to urge peace. Men refused to go into service, and desertions from the army increased.

Desertion not only weakened the manpower of the Confederacy, but also lowered the morale of the people. Poverty in the families of the soldiers was regarded as the chief cause for desertion. The unusual amount of poverty in the northern counties was caused by the severe drought of 1862, the invasion and occupation by Federals, and the lack of able men for labor. Beginning in 1861 the government aided needy families when the breadwinner was away in the army. Such aid was given to twenty-two percent of the total Madison County population in 1863.

Impressment, conscription, and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were other causes of increased disaffection. Impressment of supplies added to the bitterness and want of the Confederate people. While impressment was necessary, it was often harsh and distressing to those whose goods were taken. The conscription law was naturally unpopular because the ones forced into service were exactly those who cared little for the war.
Finally, open hostility toward Jefferson Davis and his administration destroyed confidence in the president and his policies. To make matters worse, this strong attack on Confederate policy was from a large number of public men in the South. Confederate failures turned public opinion to finding fault and searching for scapegoats. The growing idea of government favoritism toward the planters over the small farmer and backwoodsman was particularly stressed. 31

Such dissatisfaction stimulated the formation of numerous semi-political secret organizations known as the Peace Party or the Peace Society. Although having certain minor differences, the general features of the society were common throughout the state. Alabama consisted of at least three areas of concentration. One area was found in the counties of southeast Alabama, the largest in area was in the nine northern hill and mountain counties, and the third region was in the four counties north of the Tennessee River. 32

The purpose of the Peace Society, as the name implies, was to bring peace by submission to the Federal government. Many methods were used, but all of them ultimately led to one main purpose. The leaders tried to make use of all types of disaffection. Ignorant or loyal men were told that the object was to secure a change in government officials. To true disloyalists the aim was peace at any price, encouraging desertion and rebellion in the army, destroying the loyalty of citizens, and taking the state back into the Union on any terms. With thoughts toward ending the war, the members committed themselves to overthrow the Confederate government by electing men who would abolish the offices which they held. They were pledged to the destruction of the army by resisting conscription, by encouraging desertion, and by protecting deserters from arrest. This last policy was stressed in the four northern counties because of the nearness to the Federal army and because deserters did not readily collect in the area. 33
The number of Peace Society members is difficult to estimate, but it possibly included about one-half of the active men left in the state. Most members came from the poorer classes of the population with only limited experience in public affairs. Such men also became the leaders of the Society because the ablest public men were away fighting in the war. The Peace Society contained some men of ability and influence, but the majority were timid stay-at-homes. Investigations by agents of the Confederate army revealed that the Peace Society included lawyers, preachers, justices of the peace, members of the legislature, enrollment and conscription officers, members of boards of surgeons, men and officers in the county reserves, and officers in camps of instruction. Few members came from the army and then only late in the war. The true soldier despised the Peace Society and its members. The members of the Peace Society may generally be described as the doubting, despondent and dissatisfied.

The Peace Society had no written constitution, kept no written records, elected no officers and held no regular meetings. "Eminents", men who were well informed in the sign, obligations and passwords, went over the country giving the degree. The "eminents" told the initiate the names of a few members in the area, but each initiate was really independent and isolated from other members. Since formal meetings were not held, evidence against the order was extremely difficult to obtain. It was "a society without officers, a community without members."

One means of encouraging peace was to constantly recall the difficulties of the Confederacy. Lack of the necessities of life, a chaotic currency, and military defeats and invasion were problems most often cited. Dissatisfaction with the Confederate and state administration in military and civil policies inspired plans of replacing secession officials with peace men. The Peace Party had good prospects in this plan because most of
the members were at home. The organization, therefore, influenced elections far beyond the total number of legal voters.37

The first considerable success of the Peace Society was in the election of August, 1863, notably in the election of members to the Confederate Congress. Of the twelve members from Alabama, six favored reconstruction. In some counties a number of publicly unknown men were elected to the state legislature and to other offices. The election revealed such great disaffection that the work of the secret society became widely known.38

Encouraged by the victories in the election of 1863, the Peace Party continued its activities during 1864 and 1865. It elected many men to local offices, gained control of the government in several counties in North Alabama, and expected to elect a governor in 1865. Public meetings were held for passing resolutions for peace and making plans for reconstruction.39

Backed mainly by the dissatisfied property holders who were afraid of confiscation, the unionists and the Peace Society organized a party in early 1864 called the States Rights Party. This name, or Reconstruction Party, were the designated names of the late peace efforts. Most of the new advocates for reconstruction had been Douglas or Bell men in 1869.40

The States Rights Party held reconstruction meetings in Huntsville on March 5, 1864, and another about a week later. The object of the meetings was to obtain peace which would thereby restore civil government and law and order. Although the meetings were held under the protection and encouragement of the Union authorities, attendance was slight. Young men were absent because they were in the army. Of those present, all were over forty-five and all were concerned for their property. Jeremiah Clemens presided; this being one of his last political efforts before his death. Resolutions were adopted which acknowledged the hopelessness of secession
and advised a return to the Union. A longer war was said to be dangerous to the liberties of the people and the restoration of civil government. Other resolutions professed devotion and loyalty to the United States, and denied the legality of secession because the Ordinance had not been submitted to the people for their ratification or rejection. It should be noted that nearly all the objections to secession were based on the narrow grounds of the legality of the method. There was no denial of the principle of secession, nor of the fact that most of the people were in perfect agreement with the secession policy.41

Both Clemens and David C. Humphreys delivered speeches at these meetings which became widely known over the entire country. The addresses were printed and distributed throughout Alabama with the assistance of Federal officials. Some women loyal to the Confederacy, however, seized a number of packages containing the speeches and threw them into the Tennessee River.42

Clemens told the people that they had been hurried into the revolution by falsehoods, frauds, and crimes. An example of such lies was that secession was necessary to save slavery. The previously mentioned Gildchrist story was then told for the first time. Clemens asked the governor to call the legislature to provide for the restoration of peace and for the rights and liberties of the people. Even though there had been some fear of Confederate success, Clemens said in closing, "Thank God there is now no prospect of it succeeding."43

The speech by Humphreys was mainly a plan for slavery and reconstruction. Slavery, he stated, was dead. By submitting to Federal authority, gradual freedom for the Negroes could be secured. He expressed confidence in the conservatism of the North and urged that secession be revoked so the control of Negro labor might have the protection of an effective government. By returning to the Union, the people would have political
cooperation to gain control of Negro labor and as long as they pleased to abolish slavery. The right to regulate the labor question would be given to Alabama by the United States government. "There is really no difference, in my opinion," he said, "whether we hold them as slaves or obtain their labor by some other method. Of course, we prefer the old method. But that is not the question."44

Similar to the plea by Clemens, Humphreys ask the governor to call a convention to reunite Alabama with the Union. Such action from the governor, he conceded very improbable. The refusal would, however, be an excuse for independent action in North Alabama and for a movement toward setting up a new state government. The peace elements expected to win the August elections and elect as governor either J. C. Bradley of Huntsville or M. J. Bulger of Tallapoosa. The plan was to have the newly elected administration take charge at once instead of waiting for the inauguration in November.45

Despite the discontent of many people and the increasing hardships and privations caused by war and by occupation forces, a majority of the Huntsville citizens carried on the fight until the surrender. The strength of the disaffection in North Alabama was probably exaggerated by the reports of both Union and Confederate authorities. There was never much true loyalty to the United States. Some people were quite indifferent. They wanted the stronger side to win as soon as possible and leave them and their property in safety. Other people were discontented. They had supported the Confederacy for awhile, but for various reasons had fallen away and now wanted peace and reunion. The disaffected faction was a minority, but a substantial and active minority which definitely made itself heard and thus, to a degree, served its purpose.


5Southern (Huntsville, Alabama) Advocate, December 5, 1860.

6Ibid.


10Southern Advocate, December 19, 1860.

11Ibid., December 26, 1860; Denman, *Secession Movement*, 164.

12Southern Advocate, December 26, 1860; Denman, *Secession Movement*, 164.

13Denman, *Secession Movement*, 143.


15Ibid., 417; Fleming, *Civil War*, 111.


19Ibid., 26, 55.


21Tatum, *Disloyalty*, 54.

25Brewer, Alabama, 368.
26Fleming, Civil War, 127, 143-145, 404; Betts, Early History, 102.
28Frank L. Owsley, "Defeatism in the Confederacy," North Carolina Historical Review, III (July, 1926) 446.
34Fleming, Civil War, 138.
37Martin, Desertion, 113; Fleming, Civil War, 135.
41New York Times, March 24, 1864; Fleming, "The Peace Movement in Alabama During the Civil War I. Party Politics,


43 New York **Times**, March 24, 1864.


CONFEDERATE STATES
OF AMERICA:
POSTAL HISTORY
By J. M. Ross

Today when much is being written and spoken about the current Postal Service, it is doubtful that any of us have paused to reflect upon the consequences of not having any national mail service. Although the service is frequently maligned, consider the problems facing the infant Confederacy as it attempted to organize itself to provide its citizens the necessary governmental services which had previously been furnished by the United States government.

It is not likely that in all of history can there be found another instance comparable to the situation faced by the seceding Southern States. Within weeks following that fateful decision in Charleston, South Carolina, there was established within the Confederacy a government faced with the problems of financing itself; of ensuring the private, the agricultural, the industrial and the trade relations with foreign governments; and, of conducting all the other functions normal to a republican government. The Confederate Postal Service encountered many of these almost insurmountable problems throughout its brief existence.

President Jefferson Davis probably could not have made a better choice as his candidate for Postmaster General than that of John H. Reagan. Born in Sevierville, Tennessee, on October 8, 1818, Reagan traveled throughout the South during his early adult years in var-
ious business ventures. He participated in the Cherokee Wars, was a lawyer and legislator in the Republic of Texas, and was in the United States Congress at the time of secession. When Davis tendered him the cabinet office, Reagan declined twice. Upon the third request by Davis, and under the urging of several of his respected friends in the Confederate Congress, Reagan agreed to accept the position. His explanation for his reluctance was that the people, while under the Federal Government had been accustomed to regular postal facilities. It would require considerable time to reestablish such a service, he felt. In the meantime dissatisfaction would arise on account of the want and necessity of mail facilities, which would most likely be blamed on the head of the department. While he would gladly perform his duty to the Confederacy, Reagan did not desire to become a martyr. The Cabinet members agreed that they must not concede that there was a department of government which could not be organized. It was in this environment, then, that Reagan undertook the establishment of the Confederate Post Office Department.

Knowing that he was ill-prepared for the task of organizing the department, Reagan went to Washington to seek advice from Congressmen with whom he was acquainted and who still held office in the Federal service. Having in hand letters of introduction which he had obtained from his friends, he approached a number of officers of the Post Office Department requesting them to come and accept positions in the Post Office of the Confederacy. They were to bring with them copies of the last annual report of the Postmaster General and every form used by the department, together with the postal maps of the Southern States. All but two of the men whom Reagan sought out brought not only the information which he had requested, but also appointment books containing the names of all the postmasters under his jurisdiction together with their account books.

With this foundation, Reagan and his staff set about
Jefferson Davis' First Cabinet
the business of creating a postal system. Three months after his appointment he informed Davis that the Post Office Department was as completely organized as that at Washington and that he was ready to inaugurate the postal service of the Confederacy. The President and Congress promptly granted Reagan the authority which he needed to implement his program. The Department advertised for bids for contracts to acquire mail bags, post office blanks and paper for the same, wrapping paper, twine and sealing wax, circulars, marking and dating stamps, postage stamps and stamped envelopes, and mail locks and keys. 2

One of the initial needs of the infant postal service was for postage stamps, and the problem of obtaining them plagued Reagan throughout the life of the Confederacy. It quickly became evident that nowhere in the South was there an engraving or lithographic establishment with the equipment or experience to supply the stamps which were needed. In prewar years, German lithographer, Ludwig, had located in Richmond and in association with Hoyer, a jeweler, had established a modest commercial lithographing firm which was not adequately equipped to undertake the job of furnishing stamps for the Post Office Department. However, the firm got the first contract even though it was known that it would take six months before stones could be made up and production got underway. In the meantime, Reagan told Confederate postmasters to resort to such expediences as handstamping envelopes such as had been the system in the old stampless days. 3 Many post offices had old stampers which were again pressed into use; in other cases new ones were made. The postmasters took the money from the patron and handstamped on the envelope the amount paid. In small post offices, the word PAID and the amount were usually written on the envelope in manuscript. Specie soon became scarce and making change was difficult. In those instances, ac-
counts were maintained by post office boxholders with provisions for periodic settlement of the accounts. Envelopes of this period bore the marking PAID 5 or PAID 10, and were accompanied with the annotation CHARGE BOX 67, or something along that line.

The next development, from a philatelic standpoint, came when some of the more enterprising postmasters began to fix envelopes in advance which could be sold to their customers already marked to indicate the postage paid. These have come to be classified as Postmaster Provisionals. Some of them even made, locally, provisional adhesive stamps of their own designs. Most of these constitute the great rarities of Confederate philately, and there are many stamps in this class bringing thousands of dollars in today's auctions.

Meanwhile, Hoyer & Ludwig had gotten into production of stamps in Richmond and commenced making deliveries in the fall of 1861. As the postmasters got supplies of the firm's lithographs, they were used in place of the temporary expedients. The earliest known dates of cancellation of these stamps occurred in October, 1861. Some of the first were rushed to Tudor Hall, an estate in Virginia, where most of the Confederate Army was in camp at that time, and where fifty or sixty thousand soldiers were writing letters to the folks back home. Consequently, many covers may be found bearing the Tudor Hall postmark.

Hoyer & Ludwig also produced a two-cent stamp bearing Andrew Jackson's likeness for use on drop letters, unsealed circulars, and newspapers. This ended their stamp making. It appeared that the making of stamps and money in Richmond was in peril due to the close proximity of Federal troops. Transfers were then made of the stones which Hoyer & Ludwig used for the ten-cent stamps. These were turned over to the printing firm of J. T. Paterson & Co. of Columbia, South Carolina, but who moved to Augusta, Georgia, before printing could be commenced. An interesting
sidelight to the Confederate postal history is that paper was scarce at that time, and homemade envelopes were made of coarse brown wrapping paper, and flyleaves from books and even wallpaper. Envelopes were often turned inside out to be used again.

The lithographed first issues were never fully satisfactory, nor were there ever enough of them. They were but makeshifts until more and better stamps could be produced. Reagan wanted engraved stamps and the Confederate Government had established a gold balance in England through its cotton trade. Many things were vitally needed in the South and of no small consequence was the need for postage stamps. Major Benjamin Ficklin was sent to England to make purchases for the Confederate Army and Navy. He was directed to contract for suitably engraved plates for postage stamps, and for the printing of a supply which would meet the immediate demands, until local printing could be made from the imported plates. Accordingly, a contract was entered into with the firm of Thomas De La Rue & Company of London for the engraving and printing of two denominations, one-cent and five-cents. The completed order was placed aboard the blockade runner BERMUDA, which was captured by Federal warships and taken to Philadelphia where her contraband cargo was ordered sold by the courts. The postage stamps were judged as being of nominal value not beyond their worth as pulp and were ordered sold at that value. The plate, however, was deemed to possess a value beyond that shown on its face and was sold mostly for its souvenir value. Subsequently, the plate was sawed into sections and sold separately. Printings may be found today which were struck from the sections.

A new shipment to replace the lost stamps and plates got through the blockade, and the plates were installed in presses in Richmond and production began. The Richmond printings are easily discerned from the London
Five-cent stamp lithographed by Hoyer & Ludwig, Richmond, Virginia, 1861.

Two-cent stamp lithographed by Hoyer & Ludwig, Richmond, Virginia, 1862.

Ten-cent stamp lithographed by J. T. Paterson & Co., Augusta, Georgia, 1862.

Five-cent stamp engraved and typographed by De La Rue & Co., London, 1862.
prints by their poorer impressions, which resulted from varied supplies of ink and paper both of which were of inferior quality to those used in England.

Late in 1861 John Archer arrived in Richmond from New York. He was a skilled engraver and had been working for the American Bank Note Company. Whether he was enticed to come South by tempting offers is not known. Perhaps he managed to get to Richmond in the hope of accumulating wealth by engraving stamps and currency. At any rate, he appeared on the scene and formed a partnership with a politician named Joseph Daly. The firm of Archer & Daly came into being and their first jcb was printing from the De La Rue plates. Meantime, Archer was preparing to show what he could do in the way of engraving stamps. He submitted a design to the Post Office Department and was given the contract.

There may have been pressure for more of the ten-cent stamps of Jefferson Davis’s profile which were used for the letter rate, and another engraver named Frederick Halpin joined the firm. Both Archer and Halpin engraved new plates of the same general design but the engravers treated the details differently. Halpin used the Archer design and filled in the corners with additional ornamentation. He also changed the shape of Jefferson Davis’s hairline. Thus, the Archer design came to be identified as Type I and Halpin’s as Type II.

In 1864, Archer lost the contract for supplying stamps to Keatings & Ball of Columbia, South Carolina. Consequently, the stamps printed by that firm are identical in design to those of Archer & Daly. However, the supply of paper, inks, and adhesive was getting very critical by that time. The impressions were coarse, of several shades, and the design generally filled in with excessive ink. In addition to varying quality of the paper, another distinctive feature was the thick, streaked molasses type of glue which was applied.
As a part of the move to replace the lithographed stamps, the Confederate Post Office Department in early 1863 authorized Archer & Daly to engrave a new design for the two-cent denomination which was used for drop letters, unsealed circulars, and newspapers. The design was engraved by Halpin and appeared to be an attempt to copy the United States design bearing a likeness of the bust of Andrew Jackson. The United States issue was printed with black ink while the Confederate issue was printed in brick-red.

Following the two-cent Jackson, Halpin engraved what many consider to be the finest job of all the Confederate stamps, the twenty-cent denomination bearing Washington's likeness. There was no urgent need for a twenty-cent stamp prior to mid-1863, but an increasing shortage of small change indicated that such a denomination could serve to relieve the monetary problem. Bisected copies of the stamp are occasionally found today on envelopes indicating that they were used for the ten-cent letter rate. Though it may come as a surprise to find Washington's picture on a Confederate stamp, one must remember that he was a highly respected Virginian and perhaps the greatest rebel of all.

In all, the Confederate Post Office Department issued fourteen varieties of stamps including a one-cent denomination bearing the image of John Calhoun, which had been ordered from the De La Rue & Company, but never used by the Confederacy because there was no need for a one-cent stamp. Supplies of these stamps were probably seized by Federal troops with the fall of Richmond, for the stamps have been available in the philatelic trade for a number of years.

When Richmond surrendered, the executive records of the Confederate Post Office Department were entrusted to clerks for removal to the heartland. Reagan accompanied Davis and the rest of the cabinet and was with them when captured. He and Vice-President Alexander Stephens were imprisoned in Fort Warren in
Boston Harbor until their parole in October. Following his release, Reagan spent several months traveling between Washington, Virginia, and Georgia, trying to secure Davis's release from prison. He tried to recover the records of his department and retrieve personal property which had been taken from him when he was captured. Returning home to Texas, he found the people too impoverished to pay lawyer's fees and his home in Palestine destroyed. Reagan then took his motherless children to his Fort Houston farm, and tilled the soil for the next two years before returning to law practice.

A sidelight to Reagan's career occurred in the summer of 1866, when he drove his wagon to town one day with some farm tools for repair, and encountered Confederate John B. Hood on the public square. Having been good friends, Reagan offered Hood the hospitality of his humble accommodations. The two men spent several days together during which time they discussed, among other things, Hood's last campaign into Tennessee in the fall of 1864, which convinced Reagan that it was the only military move then available. Success, they concluded, was prohibited by high water in the Tennessee River, which prevented the army from crossing at Guntersville. This delay kept Hood from reaching Nashville before General George Thomas occupied the city, and the failure of a part of his army to attack in flank a moving column of Federal troops at Spring Hill, resulted in defeat at Nashville.

During reconstruction, Reagan, practiced law until reentering the United States Congress in 1875 and continued in public service until his death on March 6, 1905. Shortly before he died, Reagan was preparing his memoirs and reviewing the official reports of the Confederate Post Office Department. He found that while the expenditures and receipts of the department were increased as a number of states were added to the Confederacy, the reports showed that the service from the
start was self-sustaining, and that each year there was. annually a net increase of receipts over expenditures. Interestingly, the number of officers and clerks in the service was not as great by one-half as for a like amount of service in the United States Post Office Department. As Reagan noted:

> It should also be observed that we did not have First, Second, and Third Assistant Postmasters General as in the United States. Our officers corresponding to these were the Chief of the Contract Bureau, the Chief of the Finance Bureau, and the Chief of the Bureau of Appointments. I shall not forego the opportunity—and I trust that my motives will not be misunderstood to observe that there is much in these reports to suggest economy in the Post Office Department of the United States; and I dare say, from recent divulgences, that this is greatly needed. I am informed that a thorough overhauling and revision of mail routes has been made but twice in the United States, once by Dr. Franklin, and once by Postmaster-General McLean. It would be a considerable undertaking, but if gone through with carefully and efficiently it would no doubt reduce the expenditures of the Post Office Department millions of dollars annually.

Reagan evidently was the man for his time. His analysis of the needs of a viable postal service makes it appear that he might also have been the man for our time.

2Huntsville Democrat. April 3, 1861 and later.

3DIETZ Confederate States Catalog and Handbook. The Dietz Press (Richmond), 1959, 130-152.

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